Chile: is the fee for non-use of water rights effective? by Valenzuela, Christian et al.
c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 9  •  a p r i l  2 0 1 3 163
Chile: is the fee for non-use  
of water rights effective?
Christian Valenzuela, Rodrigo Fuster and Alejandro León
ABSTRACT This paper examines whether the fees for non-use of water rights implemented in 
Chile in 2005 have provided an incentive for the exploitation of unused water. Two 
comparisons are made and descriptively analysed: between fees charged and 
paid, and between fees and the market price of water rights. In the successive fee 
charging rounds, payment levels increased from 67% of the total charged in 2007 
to 81.4% in 2009. It was also found that several years of fee payment would be 
required to match the market price of water rights. The conclusion is that the fee 
has not been effective in discouraging non-use, since owners tend to pay it rather 
than forfeit rights whose market price exceeds the fee. Some improvements to the 
legal design of the instrument are also suggested.
KEYWORDS Water, fees, water rights, water law, prices, revenues, legal aspects, Chile
JEL CLASSIFICATION Q25, Q28, H21
AUTHORS Christian Valenzuela is a Researcher at the Territorial Analysis Laboratory (lat) of the University of Chile. 
cvalenzuela@renare.uchile.cl
 Rodrigo Fuster is a Professor at the Department of Environmental Sciences and Renewable Natural 
Resources (dca & rnr) of the University of Chile. rfuster@uchile.cl
 Alejandro León is a Professor at the Department of Environmental Sciences and Renewable Natural 
Resources (dca & rnr) of the University of Chile. aleon@renare.uchile.cl
c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 9  •  a p r i l  2 0 1 3164
chile: is the fee for non-use of water rights effective? • christian valenzuela,  
RodRigo FusteR and alejandRo león
The Water Code enacted in Chile in 1981 allowed the 
State to grant water rights to private users free of charge1 
and in perpetuity, with no obligation to justify the flow 
applied for, state the field of production involved or 
actually use the rights. The result was that a substantial 
proportion of these rights were left unused and unavailable 
for projects that might have made effective use of them, 
once water rights to the source concerned had been fully 
allocated for the purposes of law. In 2005, the Code 
was reformed with the introduction of a non-use fee to 
discourage certain market agents from accumulating 
rights.2 Now in 2011, with four fee charging rounds 
completed and a fifth in progress, this study sets out to 
determine whether the fee has effectively discouraged 
ownership of rights without effective use, by analysing 
the results of its implementation.
International practice is for water rights to be made 
conditional on specific uses, since granting rights for 
effective and beneficial uses prevents speculation and 
the creation of monopolies, as indicated, for example, 
by United States law (eclac, 1995). No provision 
was made for this in the Chilean legislation, and “the 
decision not to make rights conditional upon effective 
and beneficial uses or to adopt alternative measures has 
encouraged speculation and hoarding, facilitating the 
manipulation of water rights as an instrument of unfair 
economic competition, and meant that they can be used 
to exercise market power” (Dourojeanni and Jouravlev, 
1999). In comparative law, charging a fee for water 
rights, as is currently done in Chile, is unusual in that it 
entails an approach radically different to the “charging 
for use (or possession) of water” that predominates both 
in developed countries (Barde and Braathen, 2002) and 
in developing ones (Jouravlev, 2000) where charges 
exist. Thus, the Chilean non-use fee is an exception 
to the rule that charges apply to natural (untreated and 
non-potable) continental waters, making it an interesting 
subject for analysis.
1  The exception are the auctions carried out by the State authority 
in situations where two or more applications cannot be met from the 
water available for the creation of new water rights, in which case 
payment does take place.
2  Rights awarded before 1981 were (theoretically) in use, since the 
merced de agua, as water rights were called before that year, only 
became definitive once water extraction facilities were in place (Peña, 
2003).
While speculators usually look to profit under 
conditions of uncertainty, the situation was different in 
Chile’s water markets, since having water rights without 
effective use entailed no risk whatsoever given that:
(i) until 2006, owners were not obliged to invest in 
facilities3 to make effective use of their rights;
(ii) many of the water rights used for speculation were 
granted free of charge by the State; and
(iii) even if speculation took place with rights purchased 
in the marketplace, the risk remained close to zero 
as demand has grown steadily and the prices of 
water rights have shown a steady upward trend 
(Dourojeanni and Jouravlev, 1999).
These arguments meant that the opportunity cost of 
keeping rights unused or unsold was less than the profits 
from rising prices (Dourojeanni and Jouravlev, 1999). The 
result was a situation that was strategically problematic 
for the country, considering that water is a vital natural 
resource and an irreplaceable production input.
Consequently, in 1992 the Government of Chile 
decided on a core amendment to the Water Code requiring 
unused water rights to be surrendered, which meant that 
they would lapse after a period of non-use (Aylwin, 1992). 
However, this amendment, entailing the application of a 
command and control type instrument, did not enjoy a 
consensus among users or in Parliament; indeed, “there 
was a major debate within the Government” (Lagos, 
cited by Comisión Especial sobre Régimen Jurídico 
de las Aguas, 1997). The outcome was that the idea of 
charging for unused rights was implemented (Comisión 
Especial sobre Régimen Jurídico de las Aguas, 1997), 
although it took 13 years of parliamentary debate for 
agreement to be reached on the application of this 
economic instrument.
The diagnosis by the executive branch found 
that there were about 50,000 cubic metres per second 
(m³/s) in outstanding applications to the State from 
hydroelectric companies for non-consumptive water 
3  These are extraction facilities in the case of consumptive water rights 
and extraction and return facilities in the case of non-consumptive 
water rights. Chilean water law distinguishes between consumptive and 
non-consumptive rights. The former are defined as those that entitle 
their owner to fully consume the water concerned in any activity, 
while the latter are defined as those that allow water to be used but not 
consumed, with a requirement to return it in the manner determined 
when the right is acquired or constituted (Ministry of Justice, 1981).
I
introduction
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rights, which if granted would prevent rights from 
being constituted for a range of other uses and would 
consequently hinder economic development. In 
1996, the Department of Water (dga) of the Ministry 
of Public Works (mop) estimated that the country’s 
effectively usable hydroelectric resources (non-
consumptive water rights) from the Aysén Region to 
the north totalled no more than about 30,000 m³/s. 
At that time, non-consumptive rights in current use 
represented a total flow of 1,699 m³/s (5.7% of the 
estimated effectively usable total), while constituted 
but unused rights represented 11,203 m³/s (37.3%) and 
rights applied for and pending approval totalled 38,509 
m³/s (128%), with most being accounted for by just 
one hydroelectric company (Comisión Especial sobre 
Régimen Jurídico de las Aguas, 1997). The potential 
for monopolization, for control of hydroelectric 
generation and for closure of basins to other uses was 
obvious (Comisión Preventiva Central, 1996). At that 
time, the Central Preventive Commission (Comisión 
Preventiva Central, 1996) advised the Department 
of Water not to approve any new non-consumptive 
rights pending implementation of a legal amendment 
designed to ensure proper water usage, unless the 
projects concerned were of general interest.
The charge was thus designed as an annual fee, 
payable to the State, on the proportion of flows left unused 
because the owners of the rights had not constructed the 
necessary facilities. If the fee was not paid, the water right 
would be put up for auction. It was established that fee 
revenues (whether from payment or from auctions for 
non-payment) would be divided between the National Fund 
for Regional Development of the regional government 
concerned (65%), municipalities in proportion to the 
surface area of their communes intersecting with the 
basin and the registration area concerned (10%) and the 
general central Government treasury (25%).
At the same time, the reform made provision for 
a number of exceptional situations in which rights are 
exempted from payment of the non-use fee even in 
the absence of facilities,4 these situations having been 
included for the “peace of mind” of those who viewed 
the reform as threatening (Peña, 2009). The Act also 
established that, once the necessary facilities had been 
built, the owner would be reimbursed (via tax deduction) 
for up to the last six non-use fee payments in the case 
of consumptive rights and up to the last eight in that of 
non-consumptive rights (mop, 2005).
Thus, the goals in establishing the non-use fee for 
water rights were (Riestra, 2009a):
(i) to keep water available for those who needed it 
and had plans for it, encourage rational use and 
do away with hoarding and speculation so as to 
favour competition;
(ii) to constitute water rights for flows that were actually 
in use; and
(iii) to redistribute rights that were not in use.
Given the goals detailed above, the optimum take 
from the non-use fee is nil (Pérez, cited in Comisión de 
Hacienda del Senado, 2004), i.e., a situation in which 
all owners are making use of their water rights.
Following this Introduction, the present study is 
organized as follows: section II contains the methodology 
and the data collected for the research, section III 
expounds and discusses the empirical results, and section 
IV offers conclusions.
4  These exceptional situations are provided for in article 129 bis 4, 
point 4; 129 bis 5, fifth paragraph; 129 bis 6, second, third and fourth 
paragraphs; and 129 bis 9 of Act No. 20017 (mop, 2005).
II
Methodology and data
One mechanism for measuring the effectiveness of the 
non-use fee is to compare the amount charged with the 
actual take from it. The closer the take is to zero, the 
more successful the fee is being, as water rights with 
fee arrears are auctioned by the State and acquired by 
new owners. Conversely, the closer the take is to the 
amount charged, the less successful the non-use fee is 
being, as paying the fee allows owners to retain rights 
without effective use.
Another mechanism for measuring the effectiveness 
of the fee is to contrast the market price of rights with 
the non-use fee amount, since a pure speculator who 
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owned water rights could select the most profitable (or 
least costly) option: using or selling the water rights, or 
paying the fee while waiting to transfer the rights at the 
best possible price.
Given the above, and to determine how effective 
the non-use fee has been in its purpose of discouraging 
ownership of rights without effective use, a descriptive 
analysis was carried out by way of two comparisons.
1. Fees charged and paid
This first comparison was carried out for the charging 
rounds from 2007 (the first year the non-use fee was 
charged) to 20095 at the region and macrozone level for 
the whole of Chile, distinguishing between consumptive 
and non-consumptive water rights. Three macrozones were 
established, coinciding with the geographical breakdown 
of the non-use fee levied for consumptive rights6 (see 
figure 1). Fees were also linked to the number of rights 
and the flows of water involved. Data were taken from 
the official listing of water rights liable to payment of a 
non-use fee and databases showing the take7 from fees on 
the rights listed (dga, 2010a). This was complemented 
by reviewing the 2010 charging round to analyse the 
number of rights owners leaving and remaining on the 
list of rights liable to the 30 largest fee payments, for both 
consumptive and non-consumptive water rights, on the 
assumption that there is a particularly strong incentive 
for this group of rights to start being used.
The following criteria were then used to gauge the 
effectiveness of the non-use fee:
(i) “Percentage of fees charged that are actually paid 
and number of rights and water flow liable” (criterion 
A). This percentage is inversely proportional to the 
likelihood of rights being redistributed, since the 
closer it is to 100%, the greater the preference it 
reveals on the part of owners for paying the non-use 
fee and keeping rights unused instead of employing 
or selling them or waiting for the State auction.
5  At the time this study was carried out, the 2010 non-use fee charging 
round was under way, while the 2011 round had yet to begin, which 
is why these two rounds were not included in this first part of the 
analysis.
6  Although the geographical breakdown of charges for the non-use 
fee on non-consumptive rights is different, the data were tabulated 
for both types of rights with the breakdown described to facilitate 
comparison.
7  The list includes partial fee payments in very isolated cases, 
representing a percentage close to zero of the total fee take. For the 
purposes of the analysis, only fees paid in full were considered, as rights 
with partial payments are meant to go to auction for non-payment.
(ii) “Differences in the fees charged and in the number 
of rights and water flow liable for them between 
successive charging rounds” (criterion B). In other 
words, if in any given year the list contains fewer 
rights liable to the fee (or fewer fees charged or 
a smaller chargeable flow) than the year before, 
this means that water rights have come off the 
payment list because they have started to be used, 
so that the purpose of the non-use fee has been 
met. If the opposite happens, i.e., if in a given 
year there are more rights on the list (or more fees 
charged or a greater chargeable flow) than the year 
before, this will be because new rights have been 
incorporated into the oversight process, and not 
necessarily because no rights have come off the 
list. Consequently, no precise conclusions can be 
drawn from this situation.
2. the market price of rights relative to the fee
This second comparison was carried out separately for 
consumptive and non-consumptive water rights. For the 
former, the comparison was carried out on a regional 
scale for the whole of Chile, while for the latter it was 
carried out case by case, owing to the scarcity of data.
The comparisons only covered transactions from 
2005, when the non-use fee came into force, until 2009, 
the latest year with information available for this study. 
The transaction data were obtained from the records of 
property registries (dga, 2009), the auction section of 
the Department of Water website (dga, 2010b) and a 
private business, Remates Fernando Zañartu Rozas y 
Cía. Ltda. (Gallo, 2010).
For consumptive rights, average regional market 
prices per 50 litres per second (l/s) of permanent and 
continuous use were estimated.8 The estimation was 
carried out on a regional scale because the bulk of the 
data, obtained from the Department of Water (dga, 
2009), were not suitable for compiling a list at the basin 
or aquifer level, these being the geographical units in 
which water markets operate.9
In the case of non-consumptive rights, use was made 
of all available market transaction records that provided 
8  As well as being classified as consumptive and non-consumptive, 
water rights may be exercised permanently or contingently, and may 
be continuous or discontinuous or alternate between different users. 
Details of this typology can be found in articles 16 to 19 of legislative 
decree 1122, which fixes the text of the Water Code (Ministry of 
Justice, 1981).
9  In Chile, the boundaries of political and administrative regions 
coincide only sometimes with basins and never with aquifers.
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FIGURE 1
regions of chile and macrozones for applying the non-use fee  






















Source: prepared by the authors.
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enough detail for the fee to be calculated10 and case-
by-case comparisons made. This procedure is justified 
because non-consumptive water rights transactions:
(i) are few in number compared with consumptive 
water rights transactions, and little in the way of 
data is available on them;
(ii) mainly take place between the Maule and Los 
Lagos regions;
(iii) cannot be averaged out, since one variable they 
include is the height difference between the extraction 
and return points, which is important to the price 
because it affects hydroelectric power; and
(iv) are less influenced in their pricing by latitude 
and climate variability (a consequence of Chile’s 
geographical distribution) than are consumptive 
water rights transactions, with local variables 
having a greater influence on the value of each 
litre per second, such as proximity to the power 
distribution system or the geological conditions 
of the flow, which affect the type of hydroelectric 
installation used.11
Act. No. 20017 amending the 1981 Water Code 
(mop, 2005) yielded equations (1) and (2), which 
calculate the non-use fee to be paid for consumptive 
and non-consumptive rights, respectively:
 FC = γC · QC · f (1)
 FNC = γNC · QNC · H · f (2)
where:
FC: fee for consumptive water rights in monthly tax 
units (utm).12
FNC: fee for non-consumptive water rights in utm.
10  Most of the few records available on non-consumptive rights 
transactions fail to report the height difference between the water 
extraction and return points, or the geographical coordinates of these 
points, from which it would be possible to ascertain the altitude and 
estimate the height difference, a variable that needs to be known for 
the fee to be calculated.
11  No information is available on other non-consumptive uses, such 
as fish farming or industrial refrigeration, as they amount to only a 
tiny fraction of hydroelectricity use.
12  Monthly tax unit: a unit of account, adjusted monthly for inflation, 
that is used in Chile for tax purposes and fines.
γC: macrozonal constant for consumptive water rights 
(north-centre 1.6; centre-south 0.2; south-far 
south 0.1).
γNC: macrozonal constant for non-consumptive water 
rights (0.33 from Chiloé northward and 0.22 from 
Palena southward, these both being provinces in 
the Los Lagos Region).
QC: mean unused flow for consumptive water rights 
(in litres per second).
QNC: mean unused flow for non-consumptive water 
rights (in cubic metres per second).
H: height difference between the extraction and return 
points (in metres).13
f: progressiveness factor (1 from the first to the fifth 
year of charging, 2 from the sixth to the tenth and 
4 from the eleventh onward).
Both equations are designed for permanently and 
continuously exercised rights. Notwithstanding this, the 
design of the fee establishes the following:
(i) Contingent rights are liable to one third of the fee 
payable for an equivalent permanently exercised 
right.
(ii) For rights with differentiated flow distribution over 
the year, the annual average is taken.
(iii) For discontinuously exercised rights, any months 
with a positive flow are added together and the 
result is divided by 12.
(iv) No difference is made between fees for surface 
water and groundwater.
(v) Provisional rights are also liable to fee payment.
Lastly, the effectiveness of the non-use fee was 
determined using the criterion “Difference between the 
non-use fee charged and the market price of a right” 
(criterion C); the larger this gap is, with the market price 
representing the upper bound, the greater the likelihood of 
owners paying the fee and retaining their unused rights. 
Conversely, the smaller this gap (and whenever the market 
price is the lower bound), the smaller the likelihood of 
owners choosing to retain their unused rights.
13  This variable cannot be less than 10 m, so this value is used for 
smaller height differences.
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1. Fees charged and paid
The payment percentage rose over the successive fee 
charging rounds, from 67% of the fee amount charged 
in 2007 to 81.4% in 2009. Nonetheless, the percentage 
of all rights on which the fee was paid fell from 63.4% 
in 2007 to 50.9% in 2009 (see table 1). This situation 
arose because:
(i) some rights have been surrendered,14 some have 
been redistributed to new owners and some unused 
rights have started to be used;
(ii) the highest fees for non-consumptive water rights 
have usually continued to be paid; and
(iii) in the 2008 and 2009 charging rounds, new 
rights liable to lower fees (colloquially known as 
“smaller rights”) were incorporated into the list, the 
result being a progressive drop in the average fee 
per chargeable right and a low level of variability in 
the average fee per right charged for (see table 1).
Again, the value of fees charged was US$ 2,943,626 
less in 2009 than in 2008 (see table 1), a figure that 
reflects the removal of a number of rights from the list 
because they were surrendered, sold or brought into 
use. For this group of water rights, in other words, the 
14  Surrender of water rights was provided for in Act No. 20017 and, 
as the name indicates, it consists in a person surrendering ownership 
of a right. When this happens, the right is extinguished and the water 
associated with it becomes available; non-payment of the non-use fee 
creates a different situation, as then the water right is auctioned off.
non-use fee succeeded in its purpose, except in the case 
of rights that came off the list because their owners found 
a way of avoiding the fee, as will be discussed further on.
A more specific breakdown of the data (see figure 2) 
reveals that the fee total charged for consumptive rights 
was similar in 2007 and 2008, before diminishing in 2009, 
while in the case of non-consumptive rights the opposite 
happened, even as the number of rights liable for the 
fee, both consumptive and non-consumptive, increased 
(see figure 3). Regarding the proportion of fees actually 
paid, this has always exceeded 95% in the case of non-
consumptive rights, whereas payment of consumptive 
rights did not reach 50% until 2009. This indicates at least 
that the non-use fee is proving successful for consumptive 
water rights, while the data available do not yet allow a 
trend to be established for non-consumptive rights.
Similarly, consumptive water rights have been 
exiting the list of rights liable to the highest fees (see 
table 2), but this is not so with non-consumptive rights, 
which tend to crop up in the list year after year (see table 
3). This can be corroborated by examining the ranking 
for 2010 (the last column of tables 2 and 3), since only 
2 out of 30 consumptive rights are listed for earlier 
rounds, while a further 2 did come up in earlier rounds 
but under different ownership, meaning that they were 
sold or transferred and will presumably soon begin to 
be used. Conversely, only three non-consumptive rights 
appeared in the list for the first time in the 2010 round, 
and just two exited the list that year. The rest were 
rights that had previously been in the list, either as the 
III
empirical findings and discussion
TABLE 1





Number of rights 
(units)
Average fee per right 
(dollars)
Charged Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage Liable Paid
2007 25 349 632 16 971 827 67.0 1 302 826 63.4 19 470 20 547
2008 28 767 544 21 097 355 73.3 1 554 959 61.7 18 512 21 999
2009 25 823 918 21 017 428 81.4 2 006 1 021 50.9 12 873 20 585
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010. 
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FIGURE 2

















Consumptive rights Non-consumptive rights
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
FIGURE 3





















Consumptive rights Non-consumptive rights
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
property of a single owner or as the property of two or 
even three different owners. An example can be found 
in the fourth, fifth and sixth records of table 3, with the 
owner changing over the years (“Beatriz Cortés Torres” 
in 2007 and 2008, “Inversiones Arlequín Ltda.” in 2009 
and “Hidroeléctrica Centinela Ltda.” in 2010), indicating 
that the same right had been kept unused for four years 
by different owners.
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TABLE 2







2007 2008 2009 2010
María Estela García Constans Valparaíso 4 498 101 37 787 1 — — —
Valle Rapel S.A. Valparaíso 3 594 988 30 200 — 1 — —
Valle Central S.A. Valparaíso 904 699 7 600 — 2 — —
State. Department of Waterworks Biobío 644 797 43 333 2 — — —
State. Department of Waterworks Biobío 644 797 43 333 3 — — —
State. Department of Waterworks Biobío 644 797 43 333 4 — — —
Usuarios del Canal Biobío Sur Biobío 578 313 38 865 5 — — —
Agrícola y Comercial Los Lleuques Ltda. Metropolitan 553 533 4 650 6 — — —
Inversiones El Álamo S.A. Metropolitan 462 765 3 888 — 3 1 —
Alberto Acuña Puchi y Otros Araucanía 446 398 30 000 7 4 2 1
Proyectos de Aysén S.A. Aysén 446 398 60 000 8 5 3 —
Energía Austral Ltda.    — — — 2
Exploraciones, Inversiones y Asesorías Manantiales S.A. Metropolitan 404 920 3 402 — — — 3
Proyectos de Aysén S.A. Aysén 371 998 5 000 9 6 4 —
Energía Austral Ltda.    — — — 4
State. Department of Irrigation Araucanía 314 586 21 142 10 — — —
María Estela García Constans Valparaíso 312 677 7 880 11 — — —
Juan Landerretche Díaz y Otros Biobío 295 366 19 850 — 7 — —
Comercial San Alberto Ltda. Metropolitan 273 791 2 300 — 8 — —
Valle Rapel S.A. Valparaíso 249 983 6 300 — 9 — —
Inversiones Quintay S.A. Metropolitan 231 383 1 944 — — — 5
Agrícola Las Acacias del Aconcagua S.A. Metropolitan 231 383 1 944 — — — 6
Inversiones Quintay S.A. Metropolitan 219 479 1 844 — 10 5 —
Inversiones Arlequín Ltda. Coquimbo 158 719 4 000 — — — 7
Inversiones Arlequín Ltda. Valparaíso 148 799 1 250 12 11 6 8
Gonzalo Donato Quezada Pressac Metropolitan 140 109 1 177 — — 7 —
Hidroeléctrica Guardia Vieja S.A. Valparaíso 134 068 1 126 13 — — —
Agrícola Los Retoños S.A. Valparaíso 122 015 1 025 14 12 — —
Jorge Schmidt y Cía. Ltda.    — — 8 —
Humberto Einar y Otro Valparaíso 119 039 1 000 — — 9 —
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
Note: Records shaded in grey are water rights whose owners changed between non-use fee payment rounds.
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TABLE 3







2007 2008 2009 2010
ENDESA S.A. Los Lagos 3 526 876 850 1 1 1 1
Juan Wenke Williams Valparaíso 2 393 807 2 — 2 — —
ENDESA S.A. Biobío 1 189 538 255 — — — 2
Beatriz Cortés Torres Maule 618 707 60 2 3 — —
Inversiones Arlequín Ltda.    — — 2 —
Hidroeléctrica Centinela Ltda.    — — — 3
ENDESA S.A. Los Ríos 478 276 48 — 4 3 4
ENDESA S.A. Maule 472 623 25 3 5 4 5
ENDESA S.A. Los Lagos 438 251 255 4 6 5 6
AES Gener S.A. Metropolitan 407 365 61 — 7 — —
AES Gener S.A. Metropolitan 405 106 15 — 8 6 7
ENDESA S.A. Maule 392 830 80 5 — — —
Colbún S.A.    — 9 7 8
AES Gener S.A. Metropolitan 353 915 31 — 10 8 9
Hernán Lacalle Soza y Otros Los Lagos 318 192 270 6 — — —
Colbún S.A.    — 11 9 10
Chilgener S.A. Maule 285 784 19 7 — — —
AES Gener S.A.    — 12 10 11
Mediterráneo S.A. Los Lagos 257 034 75 — — — 12
Jorge Wachholtz Buchholtz O’Higgins 243 063 30 — — — 13
CGE Generación S.A. Maule 239 994 23 8 13 11 14
ENDESA S.A. Los Ríos 223 717 68 — 14 12 15
AES Gener S.A. Metropolitan 205 622 25 — 15 13 16
CGE Generación S.A. Biobío 204 272 52 — 16 14 17
AES Gener S.A. Metropolitan 200 343 30 — — 15 18
CGE Generación S.A. Maule 190 031 18 9 17 16 19
AES Gener S.A. Metropolitan 183 651 36 — 18 — 20
Compañía Forestal Chiloé Los Lagos 178 861 47 10 19 17 —
Inversiones y Desarrollo Sur S.A.    — — — 21
Forestal Cholguán S.A. Biobío 172 354 130 — — 18 22
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
Note: Records shaded in grey are water rights whose owners changed between non-use fee payment rounds.
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Although the total fees charged for consumptive water 
rights have been less than the total for non-consumptive 
rights (see figure 2), it is important to consider flows 
(see figure 4), as there are large differences between the 
two types of rights. These differences are not accurately 
reflected in the fees charged, since fees for consumptive 
rights are calculated by the flow in litres per second, 
whereas for non-consumptive rights they are calculated 
in cubic metres per second (see equations (1) and (2)), 
a ratio of 1,000 to 1.
As expected, only rights liable to the fee were 
surrendered, and there was further confirmation that the 
non-use fee was being more successful for consumptive 
rights than for non-consumptive ones, with figures of 
US$ 4,365,908 and 58.4 m³/s (see table 4) and US$ 
28,476 and 11.1 m³/s (see table 5), respectively.
FIGURE 4
flows liable to non-use fees and flows paid out on, 2007-2009


























Consumptive rights Non-consumptive rights
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
TABLE 4
consumptive water rights surrendered, 2007-2010
Owner Region Source Flow (l/s)
Equivalent fee 
(dollars)
Valle Rapel S.A. Valparaíso Rapel river 28 527 3 395 836
Humberto Benedetti Rosenqvist Valparaíso Unnamed 4 570 544 010
Valle Rapel S.A. Valparaíso Rapel river 5 579 221 376
Bosques Cautín Araucanía Toltén river 3 500 52 080
Corpora Agrícola S.A. Valparaíso Aconcagua river 213 25 296
Dora Elena Oelckers Los Lagos Pilmaiquén river 10 000 24 797
Agrícola Paiquén Valparaíso Aconcagua river 208 24 760
Bosques Cautín Araucanía Imperial river 1 500 22 320
Ganadera Río Caleta Ltda. Magallanes La Caleta river 1 951 14 515
Corpora Agrícola S.A. Valparaíso Aconcagua river 255 10 118
Agrícola Paiquén Valparaíso Aconcagua river 250 9 920
Bosques Cautín Araucanía Cholchol river 667 9 917
Margarita Yutronich Magallanes Blanco river 841 6 257
José Irarrázaval Larraín Araucanía La Gaviota river 219 3 255
Rolando Hott Marquard Araucanía Huilío river 88 1 302
Domingo Couso Los Lagos Lake Llanquihue 20 149
Total   58 386 4 365 908
Source: Department of Water (dga), Informe sobre patente por no uso de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of 
Public Works (mop), 2010.
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Up and down the country, there are substantial 
differences in the total macrozonal fees charged for 
consumptive rights (see tables 6, 7 and 8). In the different 
rounds, the largest portion of the total charged has been 
in the north-centre macrozone (arid and semiarid zone), 
as in this part of Chile the equation for calculating the 
non-use fee is weighted by a constant of 1.6, whereas 
in the centre-south and south-far south macrozones it is 
weighted by constants of 0.2 and 0.1, respectively (see 
equation (1)), the result being that total fees charged are 
less in these latter two macrozones.
Where fee revenue is concerned, the differing 
availability of water by latitude within Chile (with scarcity 
diminishing from north to south) and the macrozonal 
constants for calculating fees on consumptive water rights 
have resulted in payment percentages varying between 
regions in the same macrozone. One effect of this difference 
can be exemplified by the case of two neighbouring regions 
TABLE 5
non-consumptive water rights surrendered, 2007-2010
Owner Region Source Flow (l/s)
Equivalent fee 
(dollars)
Soc. Agrícola y Forestal Degenfield Los Lagos Cahulnalhue river 4 259 26 144
Rolando Polh Marquard Araucanía Palguín river 2 000 982
Soc. Agrícola y Forestal Degenfield Los Lagos Cahulnalhue river 1 752 513
Bosques Cautín Araucanía Imperial river 1 500 368
Bosques Cautín Araucanía Cholchol river 1 083 346
Bosques Cautín Araucanía Toltén river 500 123
Total   11 094 28 476
Source: Department of Water (dga), Informe sobre patente por no uso de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of 
Public Works (mop), 2010.
TABLE 6








Charged Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage
Arica y Parinacota 3 333 3 333 100.0 1 1 100.0 0 028 0 028 100.0
Tarapacá 117 992 116 682 98.9 23 21 91.3 0 991 0 980 98.9
Antofagasta 437 185 428 674 98.1 59 55 93.2 3 673 3 601  98.1
Atacama 594 777 406 575 68.4 97 63 64.9 4 996 3 415 68.4
Coquimbo 475 872 396 580 83.3 47 38 80.9 3 998 3 332 83.3
Valparaíso 6 367 626 777 629 12.2 116 53  45.7 62 240 7 917 12.7
Metropolitan 1 312 339 309 098 23.6 115 47 40.9 11 687 2 577 22.0
North-centre macrozone 9 309 123 2 438 571 26.2 458 278 60.7 87 612 21 850 24.9
O’Higgins 38 744 14 515 37.5 31 14 45.2 2 681 0 976 36.4
Maule 125 102 34 489 27.6 65 19 29.2 11 171 3 159 28.3
Biobío 86 364 13 612 15.8 14 5 35.7 5 923  0 915 15.4
Araucanía 879 953 236 726 26.9 135 64 47.4 65 644 20 327 31.0
Centre-south macrozone 1 130 163 299 343 26.5 245 102 41.6 85 418 25 376 29.7
Los Ríos 150 911 101 582 67.3 104 72 69.2 23 335 14 810 63.5
Los Lagos 159 532 82 670 51.8 45 31 68.9 28 585 11 588 40.5
Aysén 932 360 895 497 96.0 21 8 38.1 145 498 140 208 96.4
Magallanes 299 019 53 402 17.9 85 30 35.3 50 607 10 592 20.9
South-far south macrozone 1 541 822 1 133 152 73.5 255 141 55.3 248 025 177 197 71.4
          
Total 11 981 107 3 871 065 32.3 958 521 54.4 421 055 224 423 53.3
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
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TABLE 7








Charged Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage
Arica y Parinacota 3 333 3 333 100.0 1 1 100.0 0 028 0 028 100.0
Tarapacá 117 992 115 016 97.5 23 22 95.7 0 991 0 966 97.5
Antofagasta 644 254 642 111 99.7 83 82 98.8 5 412 5 394 99.7
Atacama 586 801 351 654 59.9 95 53 55.8 4 929 2 954 59.9
Coquimbo 607 703 447 298 73.6 68 41 60.3 5 105 3 758 73.6
Valparaíso 5 376 561 835 488 15.5 137 67 48.9 53 000 9 797 18.5
Metropolitan 1 752 758 1 034 532 59.0 148 51 34.5 15 934 8 803 55.2
North-centre macrozone 9 089 402 3 429 432 37.7 555 317 57.1 85 400 31 700 37.1
O’Higgins 168 148 155 314 92.4 41 29 70.7 12 444 11 582 93.1
Maule 138 425 31 158 22.5 62 13 21.0 12 013 3 135 26.1
Biobío 85 472 14 729 17.2 16 9 56.3 5 863 0 990 16.9
Araucanía 862 022 122 876 14.3 134 54 40.3 64 439 12 576 19.5
Centre-south macrozone 1 254 067 324 076 25.8 253 105 41.5 94 758 28 282 29.8
Los Ríos 146 136 111 672 76.4 101 71 70.3 22 026 16 630 75.5
Los Lagos 161 090 82 664 51.3 52 34 65.4 28 795 11 466 39.8
Aysén 932 360 893 332 95.8 21 7 33.3 145 498 139 917 96.2
Magallanes 284 504 53 105 18.7 86 31 36.0 48 656 10 552 21.7
South-far south macrozone 1 524 089 1 140 772 74.8 260 143 55.0 244 975 178 565 72.9
Total 11 867 558 4 894 280 41.2 1 068 565 52.9 425 133 238 547 56.1
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
TABLE 8








Charged Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage
Arica y Parinacota 35 871 13 253 36.9 6 4 66.7 0 508 0 198 39.0
Tarapacá 129 646 115 123 88.8 27 24 88.9 1 089 0 967 88.8
Antofagasta 726 190 724 047 99.7 84 83 98.8 6 125 6 107 99.7
Atacama 606 220 346 881 57.2 109 51 46.8 5 359 2 914 54.4
Coquimbo 516 455 241 057 46.7 58 33 56.9 4 339 2 025 46.7
Valparaíso 1 421 693 644 577 45.3 181 72 39.8 14 852 6 784 45.7
Metropolitan 1 688 064 525 992 31.2 163 46 28.2 15 390 4 461 29.0
North-centre macrozone 5 124 138 2 610 930 51.0 628 313 49.8 47 663 23 457 49.2
O’Higgins 153 158 133 483 87.2 44 26 59.1 11 421 10 021 87.7
Maule 191 522 81 816 42.7 60 13 21.7 23 815 14 896 62.5
Biobío 152 559 29 969 19.6 27 14 51.9 10 371 2 133 20.6
Araucanía 851 927 102 654 12.0 187 41 21.9 63 266 9 499 15.0
Centre-south macrozone 1 349 166 347 922 25.8 318 94 29.6 108 873 36 548 33.6
Los Ríos 254 224 173 932 68.4 214 121 56.5 38 196 26 275 68.8
Los Lagos 204 346 48 331 23.7 151 46 30.5 28 965 6 629 22.9
Aysén 933 759 891 431 95.5 25 5 20.0 146 024 139 150 95.3
Magallanes 276 200 18 379 6.7 79 16 20.3 47 175 3 114 6.6
South-far south macrozone 1 668 529 1 132 073 67.8 469 188 40.1 260 360 175 169 67.3
Total 8 141 833 4 090 926 50.2 1 415 595 42.0 416 895 235 174 56.4
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
with similar hydrological conditions: the Metropolitan and 
O’Higgins regions. In the 2009 round (see table 8), the 
flow liable to payment of a non-use fee was found to be 
similar (15.39 and 11.42 m³/s, respectively), but the sum 
total of fees charged was very different (US$ 1,688,064 
and US$ 153,158, respectively) as, predictably, were the 
ratios between the amounts paid and the amounts charged 
(31.2% and 87.2%, respectively).
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Where non-consumptive water rights are concerned, 
the percentage of fees charged that is actually paid is 
high in all regions, and the fee calculation constants (see 
equation (2)) are not a determining factor. With non-
consumptive rights, furthermore, unlike consumptive 
ones, the largest fee amounts are charged in the centre-
south and south-far south macrozones (see tables 9, 10 
and 11), for two reasons:
(i) whereas consumptive and non-consumptive rights 
that were originally less than 10 and 100 l/s, 
respectively, are exempt from fee payment in the 
north-centre macrozone, in the other macrozones 
these values are 50 and 500 l/s, so that a larger 
number of rights are excluded from the payment 
list from the O’Higgins Region southward; and
(ii) non-consumptive rights, predominantly used for 
hydroelectricity, are concentrated in southern Chile, 
where the conditions for generating this type of 
power are better than in the north.
Lastly, one thing that might explain the almost 
100% take from fees on non-consumptive rights (see 
tables 9, 10 and 11) is the considerable economic power 
of the owners of rights of this type (mainly hydroelectric 
companies and their investors), whereas the owners of 
consumptive rights operate in different sectors and have 
differing levels of financial capacity (see tables 12 and 13).
TABLE 9








Charged Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage
Arica y Parinacota – – – – – – – – –
Tarapacá – – – – – – – – –
Antofagasta – – – – – – – – –
Atacama – – – – – – – – –
Coquimbo 6 064 6 064 100.0 1 1 100.0 19 000 19 000 100.0
Valparaíso 185 813 185 813 100.0 6 6 100.0 19 525 19 525 100.0
Metropolitan 1 324 214 1 317 923 99.5 41 38 92.7 329 632 326 223 99.0
North-centre macrozone 1 516 091 1 509 800 99.6 48 45 93.8 368 157 364 748 99.1
O’Higgins 637 869 522 966 82.0 22 20 90.9 178 766 126 766 70.9
Maule 3 328 385 3 295 027 99.0 29 24 82.8 695 142 675 225 97.1
Biobío 223 422 223 422 100.0 14 14 100.0 262 997 262 997 100.0
Araucanía 687 409 618 827 90.0 56 48 85.7 481 729 362 929 75.3
Centre-south macrozone 4 877 084 4 660 241 95.6 121 106 87.6 1 618 634 1 427 918 88.2
Los Ríos 2 643 369 2 637 565 99.8 85 83 97.6 1 197 965 1 195 969 99.8
Los Lagos 4 209 094 4 173 071 99.1 67 55 82.1 1 548 904 1 518 253 98.0
Aysén 116 026 114 771 98.9 8 6 75.0 219 623 209 064 95.2
Magallanes 6 861 5 313 77.4 15 10 66.7 20 754 16 251 78.3
South-far south macrozone 6 975 349 6 930 720 99.4 175 154 88.0 2 987 246 2 939 537 98.4
Total 13 368 525 13 100 762 98.0 344 305 88.7 4 974 037 4 732 202 95.1
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
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TABLE 10








Charged Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage Liable Paid Percentage
Arica y Parinacota – – – – – – – – –
Tarapacá – – – – – – – – –
Antofagasta – – – – – – – – –
Atacama – – – – – – – – –
Coquimbo 6 064 6 064 100.0 1 1 100.0 19 000 19 000 100.0
Valparaíso 186 917 93 252 49.9 7 6 85.7 19 710 12 710 64.5
Metropolitan 2 276 787 2 267 453 99.6 50 45 90.0 458 745 454 507 99.1
North-centre macrozone 2 469 768 2 366 769 95.8 58 52 89.7 497 455 486 216 97.7
O’Higgins 1 170 448 1 169 585 99.9 38 37 97.4 281 608 280 906 99.8
Maule 3 347 907 3 327 924 99.4 32 26 81.3 699 550 678 134 96.9
Biobío 1 455 336 1 041 819 71.6 32 27 84.4 634 520 500 707 78.9
Araucanía 1 145 818 1 049 429 91.6 82 60 73.2 1 157 908 998 526 86.2
Centre-south macrozone 7 119 510 6 588 757 92.5 184 150 81.5 2 773 587 2 458 272 88.6
Los Ríos 2 951 593 2 915 768 98.8 125 103 82.4 1 995 057 1 948 879 97.7
Los Lagos 4 235 675 4 212 171 99.4 104 77 74.0 1 608 296 1 550 983 96.4
Aysén 122 739 118 909 96.9 9 6 66.7 223 793 208 515 93.2
Magallanes 701 701 100.0 6 6 100.0 6 171 6 171 100.0
South-far south macrozone 7 310 708 7 247 548 99.1 244 192 78.7 3 833 317 3 714 549 96.9
Total 16 899 986 16 203 075 95.9 486 394 81.1 7 104 360 6 659 038 93.7
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
TABLE 11








Charged Paid Percentage Charged Paid Percentage Charged Paid Percentage
Arica y Parinacota – – – – – – – – –
Tarapacá 1 107 – – 1 – – 0 150 – –
Antofagasta – – – – – – – – –
Atacama – – – – – – – – –
Coquimbo 6 064 6 064 100.0 1 1 100.0 19 000 19 000 100.0
Valparaíso 100 022 99 967 99.9 5 4 80.0 7 932 7 710 97.2
Metropolitan 2 327 341 2 319 171 99.6 55 51 92.7 467 745 464 447 99.3
North-centre macrozone 2 434 534 2 425 203 99.6 62 56 90.3 494 828 491 156 99.3
O’Higgins 1 083 655 1 073 045 99.0 37 35 94.6 279 956 277 268 99.0
Maule 3 369 928 3 369 069 100.0 31 29 93.5 700 510 697 010 99.5
Biobío 1 740 568 1 519 655 87.3 49 41 83.7 1 273 248 1 132 618 89.0
Araucanía 1 610 266 1 181 803 73.4 129 72 55.8 1 433 868 1 061 545 74.0
Centre-south macrozone 7 804 416 7 143 573 91.5 246 177 72.0 3 687 582 3 168 441 85.9
Los Ríos 3 026 896 3 005 939 99.3 132 111 84.1 2 007 726 1 947 329 97.0
Los Lagos 4 293 016 4 229 998 98.5 139 73 52.5 1 609 799 1 508 401 93.7
Aysén 122 834 121 484 98.9 10 8 80.0 223 793 213 235 95.3
Magallanes 389 306 78.8 2 1 50.0 3 383 1 870 55.3
South-far south macrozone 7 443 134 7 357 727 98.9 283 193 68.2 3 844 702 3 670 836 95.5
Total 17 682 085 16 926 502 95.7 591 426 72.1 8 027 112 7 330 434 91.3
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
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1 ENDESA S.A. Hydroelectricity 6 478 281 17 1 575 05 
2 AES Gener S.A. Hydroelectricity 3 549 024 58 1 156 32 
3 Colbún S.A. Hydroelectricity 1 771 140 22 1 514 02 
4 CGE Generación S.A. Hydroelectricity 1 183 343 16 495 53 
5 Hidroeléctrica Trayenko S.A. Hydroelectricity 1 085 390 46 259 52 
6 Inversiones Arlequín Ltda. Investment 549 584 11 13 51 
7 CODELCO Mining 378 603 22 7 55 
8 Hidroeléctrica La Higuera S.A. Hydroelectricity 286 177 13 65 60 
9 Exploraciones, Inversiones y Asesorías Huturi S.A. Investment 274 127 29 120 19 
10 Hidroeléctrica La Confluencia S.A. Hydroelectricity 233 485 8 59 20 
11 Exploraciones, Inversiones y Asesorías Mundo S.A. Investment 121 658 15 1 02 
12 Forestal Valdivia S.A. Forestry 118 157 10 14 75 
13 Álvaro Flaño García Natural person 77 252 10 66 12 
14 Maderera Panguipulli S.A. Forestry 49 119 12 50 41 
15 Eléctrica Panguipulli S.A. Hydroelectricity 38 565 11 94 85 
Total  16 193 906 300 5 493 66 
Share of total  52.0% 10.0% 51.6%
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
TABLE 13











Natural persons 4 068 945 13.1 1 329 44.3 1 345.3 12.6
Agriculture 1 583 207 5.1 376 12.5 904.6 8.5
Fishing and aquaculture 78 534 0.3 90 3.0 157.3 1.5
Mining 897 647 2.9 163 5.4 15.3 0.1
Forestry 561 805 1.8 78 2.6 239.3 2.2
Hydroelectricity 18 187 182 58.4 279 9.3 7 544.7 70.9
Sanitary services 712 931 2.3 98 3.3 14.8 0.1
Real estate 319 953 1.0 83 2.8 19.5 0.2
Non-profit organizations 60 870 0.2 40 1.3 6.5 0.1
Other legal entities 4 650 271 14.9 466 15.5 396.2 3.7
Total 31 121 345 100.0 3 002 100.0 10 643.5 100.0
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Bases de datos del listado de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas 
afectos a pago de patente por no uso, procesos 2007 a 2010, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010.
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2. the market price of rights relative  
to non-use fees
Estimates of average market prices for consumptive 
rights yield very varied results in the different regions. 
When these figures are compared with a non-use fee 
differentiated into three macrozones of application, 
disparities are found in the number of years of fee 
payment that would be required to exceed the average 
market price of rights. Whereas in the Arica y Parinacota, 
Coquimbo, Valparaíso, Metropolitan, Los Lagos and 
Magallanes regions the number of years of cumulative 
fee payment needed to exceed the average market price 
ranges from 18 to 22, in Antofagasta and Atacama the 
period is about 100 years (see table 14). This situation 
is ultimately reflected in differences in willingness to 
pay, since the non-use fee will be a smaller burden for 
owners who are being charged a fee representing only 
a tiny fraction of the price their rights could command 
in the marketplace than for those who are having to 
pay a fee representing a substantial percentage of the 
price of their rights, something that can be observed by 
contrasting the payment percentages in tables 6, 7 and 
8 with the data in table 14.
For non-consumptive rights, data were obtained on 
just eight transactions that could be used to calculate 
the equivalent fee. Although there are considerable price 
differences, it is difficult to make a comparison on this 
basis, as the rights traded differ in a number of respects 
such as flow, exercise and height difference between the 
extraction and return points. Nonetheless, the number of 
years of fee payment needed to exceed the transaction 
price allows the differences to be contrasted (see table 
15). Having isolated market prices rather than average 
ones as with consumptive rights makes it difficult to use 
criterion C to assess whether the fee for non-consumptive 
rights is sufficient to discourage non-use. However, it 
would take over two centuries of fee payment to match 
the prices that some rights of this kind would go for 
in the market, which appears to support the idea that 
the design of the non-use fee has been lax where non-
consumptive rights are concerned.
TABLE 14
estimated market price and cumulative regional non-use fees for permanent, 








Years of fee 
payment 
needed to 
exceed priceYear 1 Percentage Year 5 Percentage Year 10 Percentage Year 15 Percentage
Arica y Parinacota 262 177 5 952 2.3 29 760 11.4 89 280 34.1 208 319 79.5 18
Tarapacá 1 472 769 5 952 0.4 29 760 2.0 89 280 6.1 208 319 14.1 69
Antofagasta 2 182 564 5 952 0.3 29 760 1.4 89 280 4.1 208 319 9.5 98
Atacama 2 481 823 5 952 0.2 29 760 1.2 89 280 3.6 208 319 8.4 111
Coquimbo 337 036 5 952 1.8 29 760 8.8 89 280 26.5 208 319 61.8 21
Valparaíso 307 981 5 952 1.9 29 760 9.7 89 280 29.0 208 319 67.6 20
Metropolitan 274 622 5 952 2.2 29 760 10.8 89 280 32.5 208 319 75.9 18
O’Higgins 145 904 744 0.5 3 720 2.5 11 160 7.6 26 040 17.8 56
Maule 115 638 744 0.6 3 720 3.2 11 160 9.7 26 040 22.5 46
Biobío 85 880 744 0.9 3 720 4.3 11 160 13.0 26 040 30.3 36
Araucanía 50 095 744 1.5 3 720 7.4 11 160 22.3 26 040 52.0 24
Los Ríos 43 091 372 0.9 1 860 4.3 5 580 12.9 13 020 30.2 36
Los Lagos 22 485 372 1.7 1 860 8.3 5 580 24.8 13 020 57.9 22
Aysén 54 264 372 0.7 1 860 3.4 5 580 10.3 13 020 24.0 43
Magallanes 19 182 372 1.9 1 860 9.7 5 580 29.1 13 020 67.9 20
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of Department of Water (dga), Base de datos de transacciones de derechos de aprovechamiento a 
diciembre de 2009 informadas por los Conservadores de Bienes Raíces, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2009 [online] http://
www.dga.cl/administracionrecursoshidricos/cbr/Documents/2registrosmodificadoscbr.xls and Listado de remates de derechos de aprovechamiento 
de aguas realizados para situaciones en que dos o más solicitudes se contraponen, Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Public Works (mop), 2010; 
José Pedro Gallo, Listado de remates de derechos de aprovechamiento de aguas realizados, Santiago, Chile, Remates Fernando Zañartu Rozas 
y Cía. Ltda., 2010; and Ministry of Public Works (mop), Ley N° 20.017: Modifica el Código de Aguas, Santiago, Chile, 2005 [online] http://
www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=239221.
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As the Introduction explains, the goal of the non-
use fee is not to raise revenue but to ensure that water is 
actually used. This means that in Chile the State prefers 
the owners of unused water rights to take up one of the 
following five options instead of paying the non-use fee: 
not pay the fee and lose the right at a public auction, or 
surrender, sell, rent or make effective use of the right 
(or, strictly, build extraction and return facilities as 
appropriate). It is reasonable to think that, with each 
year that passes, owners of unused water rights will be 
less willing to pay the fee than they were the year before. 
That said, something that is helpful for the analysis is to 
know the years in the fee charging process when owners 
ought to become more willing to take one of the five 
courses described in order to exit the list. Given the 
design of the non-use fee, these should be:
(i) the first year, as the owner might simply be unwilling 
to pay a fee;
(ii) the sixth, as it is the first year in which the value of 
the fee doubles, increasing the likelihood that the 
owner of an unused right will be unwilling to pay. 
Furthermore, where consumptive water rights are 
concerned, all fees paid are recovered if extraction 
facilities are built that year, which is not the case 
in the seventh, eighth and subsequent years, when 
fees paid during the first, second and subsequent 
years, respectively, will be forfeited for good if 
these facilities are constructed, since for rights of 
this type only fees paid in the previous five years 
are refunded once the facilities are built;
(iii) the ninth year for non-consumptive rights, as for this 
type of rights only payments made in the previous 
eight years are refunded once extraction and return 
facilities have been built; and
(iv) the eleventh year, as this is the first time the fee 
quadruples relative to the first year it is charged, 
once again increasing the likelihood that the owner 
of an unused water right will be unwilling to pay.
Although these years mark milestones in the charging 
process that increase the incentive for the effective water 
use promoted by the non-use fee, it can be seen that 
the number of years of payment needed to exceed the 
average market price for consumptive rights (see table 
14) is over 11 (the last year that represents a milestone in 
the charging process) in all regions, albeit with striking 
differences, which means that the fee cannot be expected 
to disincentivize ownership of unused consumptive rights 
in the short run. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, some 
very substantial water rights have exited the list, which 
is a reason to think that the fee could improve its short-
term performance for rights of this type.
For non-consumptive water rights, by contrast, there 
are cases where the number of years of fee payment 
needed to exceed transaction prices is less than 11, 
but there are others where it is a multiple of this, with 
centuries of payment sometimes being required to exceed 
the transaction price (see table 15). In the light of the 
early tendencies observed in the level of fee payment, 
these latter cases indicate that the non-use fee will not 
meet its objective in the short run where rights of this 
kind are concerned.
3. fee evasion mechanisms
Fee evasion mechanisms have their origins in the very 
design of the non-use fee and in the original 1981 Water 
Code, which does not allow the work of promoting 
effective and beneficial use to be carried out by way of 
a straightforward correction that can be implemented 
via a non-use fee, this being in reality a fee for non-
construction of facilities. There are two main mechanisms: 
non-registration of water rights with the property registry, 
and the building of facilities without effective use.
(a) Non-registration of water rights with the property 
registry (Conservador de Bienes Raíces—cbr)
There are cases in which it has not been possible to 
carry out auctions for non-payment of the fee because 
many rights are not duly registered with the cbr, making 
it legally impossible to conduct the auction (Vásquez, 
2010). The number of water rights liable to the non-use 
fee that are not registered with the cbr is estimated at 
about 1,000, or some 30% of all rights liable to the 
non-use fee in 2010 (Riestra, 2010). The impossibility 
of auctioning off a substantial portion of water rights 
stands in the way of the objectives the fee was meant 
to achieve, for while the Code makes cbr registration 
compulsory, it does not establish any penalties for 
non-registration (Riestra, 2009b) and, furthermore, it 
recognizes the existence of unregistered rights both 
in its article 181 and in its provisional article 2. This 
unresolved situation has led some specialists to suggest 
that there ought to be a property right guarantee involving 
an administrative process whereby rights expire or are 
extinguished or terminated if not registered with the cbr 
(Schulbach, 2010).
Perversely, rights that cannot be auctioned because 
they are not registered with the cbr have sometimes 
prevented rights that are registered from being auctioned, 
as some judges prefer to auction off the whole list of 
rights at once (Riestra, 2009b).
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(b) Construction of facilities without effective use
The State water authority knows of cases in 
which water extraction facilities have been built for 
consumptive rights with the sole object of avoiding 
fee payment, without any effective and beneficial 
use existing, a situation much like the one predicted 
by some authors before the 2005 reform to the 1981 
Water Code was passed (Paredes and Gómez-Lobo, 
2000; Domper, 2003).
It is actually easy to set up installations that simulate 
groundwater extraction, with rights owners installing diesel 
engines so that they can give inspectors an explanation 
for the lack of electricity at the time of the inspection 
while claiming that they are using the water, when in 
fact these are dummy installations set up only to avoid 
paying the fee (Proschle, 2010).
As regards surface water, Riestra (2010) states that 
cases of intakes leading nowhere have been discovered; 
since these works were approved by the Department of 
Water, no fee could be charged on them for the first two 
years (2007 and 2008). There is a Supreme Court ruling 
(2010) covering these groundwater situations, but the 
reinspection process is currently slow.
The kind of dummy installations described have 
not been detected in the case of non-consumptive rights. 
As predicted by Jara and Melo (2003), it is unlikely that 
superfluous works would be built to emulate the exercise 
of water rights of this kind, since they are subject to the 
regulatory oversight of the State in the case of hydroelectric 
installations. Furthermore, the extraction and return 
installations needed to exercise non-consumptive rights 
are usually much costlier than extraction facilities for 
the exercise of consumptive water rights.
Lastly, the operation of this fee evasion mechanism, 
which is almost exclusive to consumptive rights, could 
be one of the factors explaining why more rights of 




Following this analysis of the results of applying the 
non-use fee in its first four years, the conclusion is that 
the disincentive to ownership of water rights without 
effective use is still not working well, for several reasons. 
One is that all fee charging rounds have seen payment 
levels of over 67%, and rising. Nonetheless, this could 
change if owners begin to make effective use of their 
rights, with the fees they have paid being refunded to 
them so that the take falls closer to zero. Furthermore, 
the effort to do away with hoarding and speculation looks 
weak in the initial stage because non-use fees would have 
to be paid for a number of years before the market price 
of water rights was exceeded, a consideration which 
suggests that fee payment percentages will remain high 
in the short run.
Another consideration is that, in practice, water is 
being kept available for the benefit of those who have 
the economic power to pay the fee and not exactly 
those who need the water and have plans for effective 
and beneficial use. This means that the competition for 
water use is favouring those who are in a position to 
delay their investments by paying the non-use fee, i.e., 
a subset of the universe of potential water users.
As for rights being surrendered, while there have 
been cases of this, they have been few (22) compared to 
the total number of water rights on the list, and only three 
have been substantial in terms of the fees they represent. 
The infrequency with which this happens may be due to 
the fact that the owners being charged would in theory 
be willing to accept any price higher than the non-use 
fee rather than just give up their rights, and indeed it is 
never in their interests to surrender a water right, as it 
will always be better to wait for it to be auctioned and 
then receive any surplus from the selling price.
Fees for consumptive rights present substantial 
geographical differences. The constants that were set 
to differentiate fees by macrozone within the country 
have proven to be insensitive to local realities, with 
equal treatment being given to basins that differ in their 
hydrological conditions and optimum use, the result 
being that owners’ behaviour differs by latitude and, in 
consequence, that fees are giving better results within 
a single macrozone in regions where water rights are 
cheaper (or water is more abundant).
Again, fees are much less burdensome for non-
consumptive rights than for consumptive rights. This is 
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demonstrated by the fact that fee payment percentages 
for the former have been in excess of 95% in all rounds. 
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that rights of 
this type are drifting towards hydroelectric companies, 
which have no financial difficulty in paying the fee. 
While it might be thought that the unused water rights 
which still exist remain unused because they are valued 
by their respective owners and will soon be put to use, 
it is also possible to infer, particularly in the case of 
non-consumptive rights, that it may suit some groups to 
keep these rights unused in order to prevent new actors 
from moving into their markets and maintain oligopolies.
This suggests that the efficiency of the non-use fee 
is likely to improve over time in the case of consumptive 
rights, the fees for which have proved harder to afford 
than fees for non-consumptive rights.
The aim of favouring rational use of water resources 
is coming up against owners’ fear of losing their water 
rights, an apprehension that in some cases has led to 
facilities being constructed purely to avoid paying the 
fee. This is an ambiguity that could be resolved by court 
rulings. Regarding non-registration of water rights with 
the cbr, the conclusion is that this is a severe enough 
problem to warrant legal amendments to the Water Code.
The path of “charging for non-use of water” that was 
taken in Chile is a remarkable one, an approach based 
on water abundance that contrasts with an international 
context where the scarcity approach predominates in 
the form of “charging for water use (or possession)”. 
The fact that the path chosen is unusual makes ex post 
evaluation of the legislation particularly important since 
without it, in the absence of comparable international 
experience, future amendments to the law will only be 
justified once any undesirable effects have actually arisen.
It is relevant to ask if any politically feasible 
alternative to charging for non-use might have been 
better. The requirement of effective and beneficial use, 
a universal criterion in water regulations, was a better 
option than the non-use fee; however, the only direct 
method of applying it in Chile would be for unused water 
rights to be voided, and this was not politically feasible. 
Charging for use or ownership of water is not exactly an 
alternative to the non-use fee, but rather a compatible 
and complementary instrument; furthermore, it is a long-
term initiative that is very hard to design and does not 
meet the core objective of the non-use fee (Comisión de 
Hacienda del Senado, 2000; Comisión de Obras Públicas 
del Senado, 2004, both cited by Valenzuela, 2009). Efforts 
to improve water legislation are controversial and are 
confined to the small sphere of action in which public 
policy can operate. This can be put down to the conflicts 
of interests in which water resources are embroiled, 
with disputes between the different actors often being a 
“dialogue of the deaf” that is not conducive to consensus. 
Again, among other reasons, what some consider to be 
errors in the legislation are a source of opportunity for 
others. Given this logic, establishing the non-use fee 
was an imaginative response to a problem that had no 
easy solutions (Valenzuela, 2009).
(i) A more obvious politically feasible alternative is 
to improve the non-use fee now that it has been 
established. Its design could be improved by applying 
it to basins and aquifers instead of political and 
administrative regions, thus avoiding situations in 
which changes in extraction points or the transfer 
of water rights from one region to another (i.e., 
when a water source straddles a boundary and is in 
two regions at once) lead to fees lower than those 
originally charged.
(ii) The value of the macrozonal constants used to 
calculate fees should be determined on the basis of 
the market price of water rights given that, under 
the methodologies originally employed, use was 
made of information from just one production 
sector per type of water right, namely sanitary 
service firms for consumptive rights (Peña, 1999, 
cited by Valenzuela, 2009) and hydroelectric firms 
for non-consumptive rights (cne, 1997, cited by 
Valenzuela, 2009), which skewed the analysis 
and the subsequent calculation of the amounts to 
be charged.
(iii) The progressiveness of the non-use fee for non-
consumptive rights should be as originally proposed 
in the parliamentary debate, i.e., the fee should be 
multiplied by 5 in the sixth to tenth years and by 
25 from the eleventh year onward, as the measure 
appears to have had little effect for rights of this kind.
(iv) The values of exempt flows should be applied as a 
discount to non-exempt flows. Under the present 
system, for example, a permanent, continuous 
consumptive right of 10.1 l/s in the north-centre 
macrozone is liable to the non-use fee, while a 
right with the same characteristics but a flow of 
9.9 l/s is exempt.
(v) The calculation equation should include a flat amount 
to cover the administration costs to the State of 
applying the non-use fee, given that the inclusion 
of some rights on the lists entails large costs for 
the public sector relative to their importance for 
economic development.
(vi) Any water rights belonging to any State agency 
should be exempt from fee payment, but if they 
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pass to a private owner then the arrears of fees for 
all the years in which the right was left unused 
should become payable by the State agency. This 
would prevent the State from charging itself fees 
when it held rights for strategic purposes and had 
no intention of transferring them, as with rights 
belonging to the Chilean army (military purposes) 
and the Municipality of Pucón (for the purposes of 
conservation to encourage tourism). Although the 
Water Code provides for such situations with its 
categories of reserve flows and ecological flows, it 
is on condition that these do not affect the rights of 
third parties, and they have to be approved by the 
President of the Republic. Furthermore, ecological 
flows are limited to a set amount.
(vii) Any right that is inalienable, and thus cannot be 
the object of speculation, should be exempted from 
fee payment, examples being those acquired in 
the name of indigenous communities through the 
Indigenous Land and Water Fund of the National 
Indigenous Development Corporation (conadi). 
This is in consideration of the fact that if these fees 
are charged but not paid, the water rights associated 
with them can still not be auctioned or redistributed, 
so that it is arguably pointless to incur all the costs 
of these proceedings.
(viii) Rights subject to the non-use fee that are not 
registered with the Public Water Registry held by the 
Department of Water should expire within a set time 
period following notification of this measure. This 
would prevent evasion of the non-use fee. Likewise, 
even leaving the matter of the fee aside, it would be 
advisable for any water rights not so registered to 
be liable to a fine unless the registration procedure 
is carried out within a set time; this would solve a 
recurrent problem with the Public Water Register, 
whose picture of water rights tends to be out of date.
Lastly, it is worth considering whether the non-use fee 
has meant greater pressure on water resources. In theory 
it has, because the fee promotes water use, something that 
may be a problem in drier areas, where measures ought 
to aim at reducing extraction. In practice, however, what 
has happened to date is that fees on less abundant aquifers 
have usually been paid so that the pressure implied by the 
non-use fee has yet to be explicitly manifested, although 
this could change as time passes and fees progressively 
rise. The ideal outcome would be for organizations of 
users who take water from less abundant aquifers (which 
in many cases have yet to be formed) to take the steps 
necessary to meet two fee payment exemption conditions 
specially designed for situations of this type: alternation 
or proportional sharing of water rights, and the absence of 
circumstances, acts or agreements that prevent, restrict or 
hinder free competition in their area. Success in doing so 
will necessarily depend on the support and management 
capacity these organizations acquire.
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